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FOREWORD 
During the recent decade, management science has become more and 
more interested in the strategic aspects of management. The 
changing social, economic, and technological environment of a 
company is a major challenge to which management should respond. 
Strategic management is regarded as a tool to increase organiza- 
tional flexibility in order to overcome fluctuations originating 
mainly from the business cycle or from market changes. 
In order to investigate empirically how companies faced this chal- 
lenge, MTC developed a methodology for analyzing long-term changes 
of management strategies. A dynamic approach is applied in this 
paper which reports about the preliminary results of a study 
carried out in order to test this methodology. 
Technological change, as well as any other kind of innovation, is 
traditionally associated with the idea of being potentially more 
risky than business as usual. Therefore, managerial risk taking 
behavior, measured quantitatively by use of appropriate business 
ratios, is regarded as an indicator for the strategic behavior of 
firms. The hypothesis of whether entrepreneurial risk attitudes 
change along the organizational life cycle is tested in this 
paper. A small sample of steel companies was analyzed for that 
purpose since the steel industry is very well suited to such a 
longitudinal study, thus extending IIASA's research activities on 
long-term economic cycles to the company level. 
F. Schmidt - Bleek 
Program Leader 
TES - Program 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
Change of micro- and macroeconomic structures is a necessity 
enforced by changing demand patterns, technological progress, and 
other determinants. The idea of cyclical structural change goes 
back to the 1920's when Kondratieff and Schumpeter developped 
their idea of "long waves" 1 .  The long-wave issue has also been 
one of the major issues of IIASA's research activities in past 
years.2 Empirical investigations provided some support for this 
idea, showing for example a clustering of innovation activities 
around certain periods.3 
Attention has also been paid to the question what the incentives 
behind long-term cycles are. It was basically Schumpeter's hypo- 
thesis that innovative and risk-seeking entrepreneurs are respon- 
sible for economic growth. Their new ideas create technological 
breakthroughs, old industries loose their competitiveness, and 
thus structural change takes place in economy and society.' 
Experiences from the recent past seem to support Schumpeter's 
hypothesis: Companies in many industries still have difficulties 
to cope with structural changes of the environment relevant for 
their business. In too many cases, steps to adapt to these changes 
were taken only when the firm was already in severe crisis facing 
losses and sharply declining sales. 
For example, many steel companies worldwide were still exten- 
sively expanding capacity in the 1970'9, following market fore- 
casts published by institutes like the UNID05 or the International 
Iron and Steel Institute.6 In 1976, worldwide steel output had 
already been stagnating for several years at around 700 million 
tons per year. Stagnation of demand had been caused by structural 
changes in various industries and in society. Nevertheless "some 
1,069 million tons of steel production/consumption" were fore- 
casted for 1985.' Thus the real figure of 719.1 mt was overesti- 
mated by almost 50% ! As a consequence of this kind of thinking 
in linear terms, restructuring of the steel industry started with 
1 Kondratieff, 1926; Schumpeter, 1950 and 1961. 
2 Marchetti, 1981; Marchetti/Nakicenovic, 1979. 
3 Kleinknecht, 1987; Mensch, 1979 
4 Schumpeter, 1961. 
5 UNIDO, 1976. 
6 International Iron and Steel Institute, 1972. 
7 UNIDO, 1976, p.32. 
1 
a substantial delay and still causes severe problems (e. g. to 
the labor market) in many countries. 
This paper is generally dealing with the question if - mainly 
large - companies can prepare for and offset economic crisis in 
advance by improving their strategic management. A major objective 
of strategic management which obviously was not met completely in 
the past is to guarantee that the company fulfills it's longterm 
goals. In market economies usually the main goal is to sustain 
profitability. 
2. GOALS, ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Most large companies are not flexible enough to adapt quickly to 
short-term fluctuations of the business cycle. Additionally every 
industry is faced with structural change in the long run. Environ- 
ment changes rather smoothly according to the long waves theory, 
so that plenty of time is available theoretically for adaptation 
in ths case. Adaptation is especially necessary if the survival 
of the firm is important because of strategic (e.g. steel in- 
dustry) or social (e.g. labor market monopoly) reasons. However, 
two obstacles are to be mentioned : 
First, weak signals announcing the direction of changes are dif- 
ficult to interpret properly. Strategic decisions are more risky, 
therefore, than short-term decisions, as they are taken under 
higher uncertainty. Expressed in mathematical terms this means 
that the variance of possible outcomes of a long-term decision is 
higher. 
Second: Regarded from a short-term point of view, excluding the 
necessity to prepare for structural change, the goals of a company 
can also be met without taking risky long-term measures for a cer- 
tain period of time. Especially under conditions of industrial 
growth, expansion of those fields that are successful currently 
appears to be the most reasonable way to raise profit. 
The level of risk taking can be controlled by management much 
better than other determinants of its decisions. Even a risk- 
averse decision-maker would therefore incur more risk during a 
phase of growth provided that he takes the existence of permanent 
environmental change as given than if he relied on the persistence 
of expansion. 
However, the experience of the past shows that short-term oriented 
goals still prevail in many companies. Long-term environmental 
trends seem to be excluded from strategic planning processes as 
long as profitability can be sustained by short-term decisions. 
Consequently, company strategy based on linear growth thinking 
deviates more and more from changing market requirements. For 
many companies only entrepreneurial crisis was a sufficient incen- 
tive to adapt to these changes. From that, however, it appears as 
if increased risk-taking cannot be avoided in the long run, but 
only be postponed. 
The question arises if companies could improve their resistence 
against crisis by taking more risk than they do as long as they 
are in a favourable position. Related to these considerations the 
following two hypotheses were formulated to be tested empirically: 
1. Companies generally tend to take less risk during phases of 
industrial growth than during phases of stagnation or de- 
cline. 
2. Above average risk-seeking under growth conditions helps 
companies to cope with recession. Relative risk aversity 
under growth conditions, however, has the reverse effect on 
a company's position under crisis conditions. 
The approach presented is based on the idea that business risk 
taking behavior, measured quantitatively by use of appropriate 
business ratios, can describe decision makers' attitude towards 
structural change. Business performance, measured by another set 
of business ratios is assumed to develop in the long run according 
to a cyclical pattern that also became known as the industry- or 
business- life cycle. However, the life cycle is not seen as a 
normative concept but rather as a result of linear thinking during 
economic growth and thus neglecting structural change as long as 
possible. 
Thus, the paper contains several new contributions to the analysis 
of the relationship between business risk and return : 
- Changes of entrepreneurial risk attitude over time are in- 
vestigated; 
- the industrial life cycle (in the sense mentioned above) is 
tested as the explaining variable for these changes; 
- several new indicators for business risk and return are 
suggested and used simultaneously together with conventional 
ones ; 
- in order to monitor dynamics sufficiently, all indicators are 
analyzed over a period of 35 years; 
- the sample investigated is not restricted to the industry of 
one nation but contains companies from variou~countries. 
3. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Schumpeter's contributions regarding the importance of entre- 
preneurial risk attitude have already been mentioned. More recent- 
ly, both theoretical and empirical analysis has addressed the 
relationship between business risk and return: The conventional 
argument for economic rationality suggests that because the typi- 
cal business executive is risk-aversea, a higher risk investment 
requires a higher expected return. This hypothesis was tested for 
several industries in the United States by studies published in 
the late 60ies.9 Empirical studies to support this approach have 
faced one major problem. While the risk may be considered before 
committing resources (i.e., ex ante), the effects and aggregation 
of numerous commitments can only be observed over time (i.e., ex 
post). Therefore, the profit variance was frequently used as a 
measure of risk. Return was measured by the amount of annual 
profit. 
Both studies cited seem to confirm that risk and return are posi- 
tively correlated on an industry level, at least in retrospec- 
tive. Despite the fact that relatively long periods were ob- 
served, the investigations have to be regarded as static as no 
changes in risk attitude nor in economic performance were taken 
into consideration. 
The positive correlation between return expectations and risk 
attitude has been criticized by Edward H. Bowman.10 He applied 
roughly the same approach to investigate risk and return on US- 
company - level. Thus, he found out that enterprises with a high 
profitability seemed to be less risk-taking than companies in a 
weak position. Despite the fact that Bowman tried to strengthen 
his hypothesis, which he called the Risk-Return Paradox, with 
further investigations" and that he was one of the first to 
mention that risk attitudes might be different in different situa- 
tions of business performance, his studies remained cross-sec- 
tional and therefore static. Long-term dynamics of industries or 
the economy as a whole were not seen as a determinant of business 
risk attitude. 
In 1984, Manfred Perlitz and Helge Lobler confirmed Bowman's 
results by using his methodology to analyze 10 West-German in- 
dustriesll. The authors themselves mention at the end of their 
paper that economic growth and decline might have an impact on 
managerial risk attitudes. 
Recently, Ayres and Mori mentioned in their paper that "external 
circumstances (i.e., the life cycle) can strongly influence at- 
titude to risk. In fact, the conventional idea that risk aversion 
a Gravelle/Rees, 1981, p. 553. 
9 Conrad/Plotkin, 1968; Cootner/Holland, 1970. 
l o  Bowman, 1980. 
1 1  Bowman, 1982 and 1984. 
1 2  Perlitz/Lobler, 1985. 
and risk-seeking are unchanging characteristics of decision-makers 
must now be challenged."l3 Consequently, this idea is going to 
be analyzed empirically in this paper. As mentioned, the basic 
assumption is that during growth phases decision-makers tend to 
perceive their economic environment as stable which has a substan- 
tial influence on their attitude towards risk. One reason for 
this ceteris paribus assumption can be provided by A .  H. Simon's 
theory of bounded rationalityl4. 
This theory is a fundamental critique of the traditional, mathe- 
matically oriented theory of decision taking under uncertainty. 
Mainly he emphasized that in reality there is an important limi- 
tation on the computational and information processing capabili- 
ties of decision-makers which creates a constraint that makes 
only a limited degree of rationality possible. A decision-maker 
therefore would not take all possible alternatives into considera- 
tion in order to identify the optimal solution to his problem 
(actually this would be an infinite number in most cases). Rather 
he would terminate his search as soon as a sufficient solution 
was found in the sense that it meets the goals of the decision- 
maker. 
4. GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
4.1. Object of Investigation 
For many reasons, the steel industry can serve as a good example 
to investigate managerial risk attitude changes over the in- 
dustrial life cycle. First, the steel industry is a large-sized 
industry of major attention to economists and politicians. Be- 
cause of that, it's development is well documented in literature, 
making it possible to collect the necessary information over a 
long range of time. Second, steel industry frequently is men- 
tioned as a typical example for cyclical performance resulting 
from structural change.'= 
Two of these cycles are depicted in graph 1, showing annual growth 
rates of world steel production. This curve also shows that the 
major part of the recent cycle is included in the period from 
1950 to 1985 which we chose as the period of investigation for 
this study. It is well-known from literature that this cycle 
showed very typical patterns with a substantial worldwide increase 
of output during the 1950's and 1960ts, and a severe recession 
starting in the early 1970's. 
1 4  Simon, 1979. 
1 s  Ray, 1984. 
GRAPH 1 1 6  WORLD CRUDESTEEL PRODUCTION 
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16% 1 I 
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- 2 1 Y. MOWNC AVC. 
The fact that steel industry is closely interrelated worldwide, 
justifies our attempt to do an international comparative study 
based on time series. In order to homogenize the sample from a 
technological point of view the respondents were selected accor- 
ding to the following criterion: Between 1952 and 1962 exactly 30 
companies from different countries adopted the so-called BOF 
process which is one of the most important technological innova- 
tions in steel industry since World War 2.17 The firms were 
approached by letter and inquiry form and asked to provide infor- 
mation that is usually contained in annual reports. Approximate- 
ly 50% of our sample responded positively to the request. The 
data of 10 companies representing 8 countries (Austria, Austra- 
lia, Brazil, Canada, West Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, and the 
United States) have been computerized and provide the data base 
for this study. 
4.2 Businesa Ratioa to Meaaure Riak and Return 
To measure the dynamic development of risk attitude and company 
performance, we apply principally the same tools as suggested in 
'6 Source: ECE, IISI. 
l 7  Stone, 1966. 
previous studies.18 Risk attitude and company performance are 
assumed to be measurable by ratios calculated from the figures 
provided in company annual reports, balance sheets, and profit 
and loss statements. The desire to make companies comparable, 
not only within the same period, but also in a dynamic sense was 
one of the major reasons for developing business ratios.19 In 
addition to those ratios already suggested in previous studies, 
we will test the validity of some others to get a more objective 
picture. In chapter 5 the data collected will be presented in 
graphic form. 
4.2.1 Ratios to Measure Company Performance 
The ratio "(annual company profit + interest payments) / total 
capital" generally known as the return on investment (ROI), is 
one of the measures that indicate a company's profitability. It 
must be stated, however, that profit as published in the annual 
report is usually subject to accounting measures. By analyzing 
the balance sheets carefully, some of these influences can be 
corrected. Nevertheless, these drawbacks should be taken into 
consideration. 
The same comments are basically valid for the ratio return on 
equity (ROE). "Net profit (after deduction of interest pay- 
ments)/shareholders' equity" can be regarded as the interest 
provided to the shareholders by the capital they have invested in 
the company. 
Another ratio which we regard as relevant for this study is 
profit on sales. This ratio is not only a measure of company 
performance, but also an indicator of market strategy. During a 
growth phase, companies usually produce relatively small scales 
of products, selling them with a high profit share per unit. The 
maturity phase is often characterized by companies' trying to 
increase their sales substantially in order to cope with decreas- 
ing profit rates per unit. 
The fourth performance indicator is annual change in employment 
rate. For several reasons, companies are very careful about 
increasing or decreasing their work force. Nevertheless, these 
movements are also considered to reflect company performance in 
the long run. 
Changes in steel production relative to the previous year also 
indicate wether a company currently acts in a prosperous or in a 
declining market. 
1 8  Conrad/Plotkin, 1968; Cootner/Holland, 1970; Bowman, 1980, 
1982, and 1984; Perlitz/Lobler, 1985. 
1 9  Seicht, 1983; Spurga, 1986. 
The five ratios mentioned are expected to show a negative develop- 
ment over the period 1950-1985. Nevertheless, not all of them 
will reflect economic changes in the same way. Work force fluc- 
tuations especially are expected to show a certain time lag. 
4.2.2. Ratios to Measure Managerial Risk Attitude 
Quantitative measures for qualitative issues must always be re- 
garded as approximations. This is also true for measuring man- 
agerial risk attitude. Variance of ROI and ROB have been used as 
measurements of risk attitude in several studies mentioned, since 
high profit fluctuations within short time periods are regarded 
as indications that the company is in a risky situation (see the 
definition of risk in chapter 2). 
The ratio long-term liabilities / equity measures the readiness 
of a company to accept long-term commitments with external inves- 
tors (banks) and also possibly to accept an increased external 
influence. Obviously, this ratio can indicate a readiness to 
take risks. 
Productivity, measured by "company crude steel production / total 
work force", might also serve as a proxy for managerial risk at- 
titude, although some drawbacks have to be mentioned. First, the 
total work force of a steel company is not usually involved in 
steel production. However, a high share of the work force not 
involved with steel production can indicate that the company is 
active in other strategic business units as well. Both diver- 
sification and increased productivity through technological in- 
novation can be regarded as risky activities. This justifies, in 
our opinion, the inclusion of this indicator in our study. 
Diversification activities generally are regarded to be more 
risky than business-as-usual.20 As the fifth risk indicator, 
therefore, we have chosen the diversification activities that is, 
the annual change in the level of diversification mentioned by 
the company in its annual reports. The level of diversification 
is estimated by grouping all products produced by the company 
according to the 4-digit levels of the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC codifi- 
cation developed by the United Nations in 1968). 
2 0  Meffert, 1980, p. 37. 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Each of the two hypotheses formulated in chapter 2 will be analy- 
zed separately by application of different tools. The appendix 
contains all abbreviations used. 
5.1 Empirical Findings on Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis suggested can also be formulated in mathe- 
matical language: A negative correlation is expected to be found 
over time between risk ratios (ROI-variance, ROE-variance, LTL/EQ, 
Productivity, DIV) on the one hand and company performance (ROI, 
ROE, POS, LF, CCS) on the other. For regression analysis, time 
series of 5 risk ratios and 5 performance ratios are available, 
which were taken from 10 companies. Risk taking is expected to 
increase as a consequence of structural change indicated by de- 
teriorating performance. Therefore the performance ratios are 
taken as independent variables XI . . .  xs to explain risk. 
On a national level, the industry life-cycle can be characterized 
by annual output growth rates. In graph 2 the average figures are 
shown for the 8.countries related to our sample. 
W. Laitnar. IWA-MTC, 1988  
9 Y. MOVlNC AVC. + NCS (SAMPLE) 
GRAPH 2 NATIONAL CRUDESTEEL PRODUCTION 
ANNUAL CHANCES (UMPLE AVERAGE) 
2 5% 
Source: Mitchel, 1980 and 1985; IISI. 
20% - + 
+ + 
X negative development similar to the trend shown in graph 1 is 
indicated over almost the entire period of observation. The trans- 
ition of steel industry from growth to decline can be observed. 
How this trend is reflected by the performance of our sample? 
GRAPH 3 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
SAMPLE AVERAGES 
13% 
W. Laitnar. IUA-MTC. 1988 
0 LF + CCS 0 CCS AVG (50-85) 
In graph 3 the development of two performance indicators is de- 
scribed. Regarding the average of firms, it turns out that steel 
production (CCS) and labour force (LF) developped roughly ac- 
cording to what was hypothesized. However, no time-lag can be 
observed with employment, but a rather constant decrease in growth 
rates is shown, finally even becoming negative. 
Sample steel output grew more substantially than on national or 
world level. This is probably due to the fact that the companies 
investigated were more advanced from a technological point of 
view and therefore aimed at earning the benefit of their advantage 
by applying their technology more extensively. 
On average the steel output growth rate was approximately 7% over 
the 35 years observed. After 1970 annual growth rates were below 
that average. This phenomenon is used in the next chapter to 
characterize the transition of steel industry from growth to 
maturity. Graph 4 refers to the other three indicators of company 
performance: 
GRAPH 4 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
SAMPLE AVERAGES 
10 
W. Leltner, IIAU-WTC. 1 9 8 8  
0 ROI + ROE 0 POS 
Again, this graph shows the development of annual averages calcu- 
lated for the sample of companies investigated. Return on invest- 
ment does not show the expected negative trend but remains rather 
stable at a 5% level. A reason for this phenomenon can be found 
in the fact that many steel companies had to raise loans in order 
to sustain profitabilityzl. As a result, interest payments in- 
creased substantially, which obviously has an impact on ROI. 
Return on equity is not influenced by these payments. Obviously 
companies were aiming at keeping this ratio stable as well. How- 
ever, due to decreasing profitability they succeeeded in this 
goal only until 1977. On the other hand, profit on sales decreased 
rather constantly between 1950 and 1985. 
Having shown some evidence for negative trends in business perfor- 
mance along the industrial life cycle, we are ready to test hypo- 
thesis 1 now. The dependence of each risk ratio (y) is tested 
separately by application of the following equation: 
y = a + bxl + cxt + dxr + exr + fxsg 
2 1  Stepan, A. et al., 1988. 
According to what was mentioned above, a negative value of the 
coefficients b, c, d, e and f would support hypothesis 1. The 
five pictures below refer to the five risk ratios to be tested. 
Each of them contains two time-series, one (characterized by x- 
symbols) referring to the annual sample average of the ratio-and 
the other showing the curve estimated by multiple regression. 
GRAPH 5 RISK INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
SAMPLE AVERAGE: VARlANCE O f  ROI 
W. Loltnor, IMA-UTC. 1988 
+ ROW EST. ( X I  ... XS) x ROI VARIANCE 
TABLE 1 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of V Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
RO I 
X Cocfficient(s) 1.87 
Std Err of Coef. 0.35 
t-TEST (Hlr Coef. < 0): 
am0.05; t= 1.697 HO 
a-0.011 t= 2.457 HO 
DURBIN - WATSON TEST: d = 
V = ROI VARIANCE 
2.63 
0.324 
0.990 
36 
30 
ROE P.O.S. LF CCS 
-0.56 -0.48 20.79 -47.00 
0.05 0.13 11.08 6.00 
Similarly to the method of moving averages, variances of ROI (and 
ROE as will be shown below) were calculated for consecutive peri- 
ods of 5 years in order to monitor the dynamic changes of these 
indicators. Data indicate a significant increase in entrepreneuri- 
al risk taking starting in the 1960's. This observation supports 
the hypothesis that risk attitude changed as a consequence of 
structural change only. 
Table 1 provides the results of regression analysis for y = ROI 
variance. A regression coefficient of 0.99 indicates basically 
that y can be explained very well by the independent variables we 
selected. In fact, graph 5 shows that the estimated curve fits 
the data quite accurately. However, only the coefficients for 
ROE, POS and CCS are negative. According to t-Statistics, hypothe- 
sis 1 has to be rejected for ROI and LF. 
In order to check wether the estimation was influenced by auto- 
correlation, Durbin Watson Test was applied. A d-factor of 2.09 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation regarding this risk 
indicator. All in all, the analysis on ROI variance seems to 
support hypothesis 1. Graph 6 and table 2 contain similar results 
on ROE variance: 
GRAPH 6 RISK INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
VARLCINCE OF ROE (SAMPLE AVERAGE) 
450 
W. Laitnor, I W - M T C ,  1988  
+ ROW EST. (X I  ... XS) x ROE VARIANCE 
ROE variance, too, increases along the period investigated. A Rz 
of 0.98 indicates again that the estimated curve fits the data 
quite well (see table 2 ) .  
TABLE 2 Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
RO I 
X Coefficient(s) 70.37 
Std Err of Coef. 18.35 
Y = ROE VARIANCE 
-28.18 
16.987 
0.983 
36 
30 
ROE P.O.S. LF CCS 
-39.71 16.75 -1769.89 -385.47 
2.86 6.67 581.23 314.85 
t-TEST (HI:  Coef. < 0 ) :  
a=O.OS; t= 1.697 HO H1 HO H1 HO 
a=0.01; t= 2.457 HO Hi HO H1 HO 
DURBIN - WATSON TEST: d 1.25 
Nevertheless, only ROE and LF coefficients significantly explain 
this risk ratio according to t-statistics. A separate analysis 
for POS, however, indicated a negative relationship in this case, 
too. According to Durbin Watson test, autocorrelation seems to be 
low. Consequently there is no evidence that hypothesis 1 should 
be rejected. 
GRAPH 7 RISK INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
UMPLE AVERAGE: LTM. LUBIL. / EOUlPl 
190 
W. Lmitner. IVSA-UTC. 1988 
+ LTL ~ g .  (XI ... XS) x ~ n / ~ o u r w  
Long-term liabilities on equity increased slightly during the 
1950's and 1960's (graph 7). After 1970, the companies extended 
long-term debts quite substantially. According to regression 
analysis, performance indicators again explain the dynamics of 
this risk ratio quite well. Significant negative coefficients 
were obtained on ROE, POS and CCS. Durbin Watson test does not 
indicate dangerous autocorrelation. To put it briefly, hypothesis 
1 seems to be supported again. 
T A B L B 3  Regression 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
X Coefficient(%) 
Std Err of Coef. 
Output! Y = LONGTERM LIABILITIES / EQUITY 
51.30 
4.732 
0.992 
36 
30 
ROI ROE P.O.S. LF CCS 
35.19 -8.83 -12.99 86.98 -371.88 
5.11 0.80 1.86 161.93 87.71 
t-TEST (Hlr Coef. < 0)s 
a10.05; t= 1.697 HO H1 H1 HO H1 
a=O.Ol; t= 2.457 HO H1 H1 HO H1 
DURBIN - WATSON TEST: d 1.36 
From 
steel 
obser 
their 
graph 8 it 
output per 
ved. Compani 
can be concluded that productivity measured by 
emloyee increased steadily over the entire period 
.es invested continuously in the improvement of 
technolbgies in order to save labour costs. Those invest- 
ments, however, indicate that companies were ready to take the 
risk of technological change only when market forces induced them 
to do so. 
Table 4 contains the testing results on productivity. As R2 is 
rather high again, the estimated curve seems to explain data 
sufficiently. Nevertheless Durbin Watson test indicates a substan- 
tial influence of autocorrelation. Productivity therefore cannot 
be regarded as a useful indicator for entrepreneurial risk, 
GRAPH 8 RISK INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
STEEL PROO. / EMPLOYEE (SAMPLE AVERACE) 
0.20 
W. Leltner. IUU-MTC. 1 9 8 8  
+ ccs ~ n .  ( x i  ... XS) X CCS/LF 
TABLE 4 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std E r r  o f  Y Est 
R Squared 
No. o f  Observations 
Degrees o f  Freedom 
RO I 
X C o e f f i c i e n t ( s )  0.016 
Std E r r  o f  Coef. 0.005 
t-TEST (HI: Coef. < 0 ) :  
a=O.OS! t =  1.697 HO 
a=0.01? t =  2.457 HO 
DURBIN - WATSON TEST: d = 
Y = STEEL OUTPUT / EMPLOYEE 
0.18 
0.005 
0.987 
36 
30 
ROE P.O.S. LF CCS 
-0.005 -0.019 0.468 -0.269 
0.001 0.002 0.162 0.088 
Diversification activities were suggested as the fifth indicator 
to describe dynamics of managerial risk attitude. However, graph 
9 surprisingly indicates a decrease in diversification activities 
over time. Thus it turns out that companies extended their range 
of products more intensively before 1970 than afterwards. Accor- 
ding to table 5 all performance indicators are positvely related 
to DIV except LF. As Durbin Watson test indicates a lot of auto- 
correlation, this ratio must be excluded from our group of in- 
dicators. 
GRAPH 9 RISK INDICATOR TIME SERIES 
OIVERSIFICATON CHANCES ( W P L E  A*.) 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Output: 
Constant 
Std Err of Y Est 
R Squared 
No. of Observations 
Degrees of Freedom 
ROI 
X Coefficient(s) 0.0029 
Std Err of Coef. 0.0013 
t-TEST (HI: Coef. > 0): 
az0.05; t= 1.697 H1 
a=0.01; t= 2.457 HO 
DURBIN - WATSON TEST: d = 
Y = ANNUAL CHANGE IN DIVERSIFICATION 
-0.004 
0.001 
0.949 
36 
30 
ROE P.O.S. LF CCS 
0.0007 0.0009 -0.0208 0.0573 
0.0002 0.0005 0.0396 0.0215 
Generally, hypothesis 1 seems to be supported by the data shown 
above. Ratios on the average performance of our sample declined 
while risk ratios grew simultaneously. Some significance for the 
interrelation of both groups of variables was found. For various 
reasons mentioned, ROI as well as productivity and diversification 
activities cannot be used to support hypothesis 1 as indicators. 
5.2 Empirical Findings on Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 formulated in chapter 2 implicitly says that charac- 
teristic deviations from the general trend suggested by hypothe- 
sis 1 will be observed. Therefore data have to be disaggregated 
in two directions in order to test hypothesis 2. 
First, companies have to be analyzed separately by comparing their 
individual ratio values with the sample averages. Thus, devia- 
tions can be revealed easily. Second, we have to distinguish 
between growth and maturity phase of economic development. In 
chapter 5.1 we found evidence for the assumption that the period 
of 1950 - 1985 coincides approximately with these phases. Re- 
ferring to page 10 of this paper we define as growth phase the 
period lasting from 1950 to 1970. 1971 to 1985 is related to the 
maturity of the current steel industry cycle. 
By calculating averages (AVGi j p )  for each phase p ( p  = 1,2), 
characterizing the behavior of companies j (j = 1, . . .  *lo) accor- 
ding to indicators i ( i  = 1,...,10) and subsequently aggregating 
these AVGijp, we obtained for each company j and each phase p one 
value R characterizing risk taking behavior and one value P cha- 
racterizing performance. Those 40 values represent the input for 
testing hypothesis 2 : 
TABLE 6 
E02 61.26% HIGH 
E01 52.09% HIGH 
I04 46.43% HIGH 
CO 1 6.25% HIGH 
SO4 4.75% HIGH 
I03 1.24% LOU 
KO2 -27.06% LOU 
B0 1 -35.14% LOU 
A0 1 -37.93% LOU 
LO 1 -48.53% LOU 
AVG : 2.34% AVG : 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOU 
LOU 
LOU 
LOU 
TABLE 6 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOW 
LOU 
LOW 
LOW 
LOU 
LOW 
LOU 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOU 
LOU 
LOU 
CSVG : -2.66% AVG s 1 .l6% 
Each value in table 6 is characterized by the code of the company 
it refers to. By comparing the values of each group with the 
group average it is possible to characterize each value as 'high' 
or 'low', relative to the sample of firms. It has to be stressed 
that these classifications are related to the phase and not to the 
entire period of observation. According to previous studies, data 
structured like those in table 6 can be analyzed most easily by 
application of contingency tables . 
In order to test hypothesis 2 risk taking behavior in phase 1 
( R 1 )  has to be related to company performance in phase 2 (P2) : 
TABLE 7 P2 I high 1 low 
low 1 801, AO1. I 103, KO2, LO1 
high 
R1 
According to table 7, 8 of 10 companies seem to support our hypo- 
thesis 2. Moreover, Xl-test indicates 85 % probability for the 
existence of a significant relationship between the two dimen- 
sions. 
Table 8 provides some more figures derived from our database. The 
entries characterize the amount of indicator fluctuation between 
the two phases analyzed. Of course stability of performance is an 
important goal of strategic management. A high fluctuation, there- 
fore, can be regarded as a result of low resistence against 
C01, E01, E02, 
104, S04. 
- 
crisis. PF1 refers to fluctuation of performance indicators, 
whereas RF1 refers to dynamics of risk ratios. 
TABLE 8 PF 1 RF 1 
SO4 -7.61% LOU 104 33.59% LOU 
E02 -29.12% LOU €02 48.69% LOU 
KO2 -46.20% LOU KO2 66.99% LOU 
104 -49.45% LOU A0 1 92.42% LOU 
€0 1 -49.80% LOU €0 1 417.36% LOU 
CO 1 -51.54% LOU LO1 1191.86% LOU 
A0 1 -58.38% LOU CO 1 1966.71% LOU 
80 1 -94.96% HIGH SO4 4947.71% HIGH 
103 -100.40% HIGH 103 5179.19% HIGH 
LO 1 -166.21% HIGH B01 10027.07% HIGH 
AVG : -59.43% AVG : 5011.74% 
TABLE 9 PF1 I high I low 
low I B01, 103, L01. I A01, K02. 
high 
R1 
X2 again indicates that a relationship exists with 85 % probabi- 
lity. According to table 9 ,  companies that incurred more risk 
during industrial growth were able to keep their performance more 
stable later on than companies that were more hesitant during 
growth. Table 8 shows that all firms suffered more or less from 
deteriorating performance. The consequences, however, were more 
severe for those companies that showed a below-average risk-taking 
attitude in phase 1. Table 10 contains fluctuation values re- 
ferring to risk ratios (RF1). 
TABLE 10 
- 
RF1 
high I low 
C01, E01, E02, 
104, S04. 
high 
R1 
low 
7 of 10 companies support the hypothesis saying that relatively 
high risk taking during phase 1 will result in greater stability 
under crisis conditions. Nevertheless due to the small sample, 
significance is only 45 X in this case. 
Finally, two contingency tables are presented to test Bowman's 
Risk-Return Paradox in the traditional sense, under static con- 
ditions. Each table refers to one phase only. As above, "hiph" 
and "low" are relative judgements, characterizinp company devia- 
tion from sample phase averapes. 
P1 
high I low 
low 
Regarding the growth phase, no evidence can be found for the 
Risk-Return Paradox. On the contrary, the idea seems to be sup- 
ported by 7 companies that high risk is connected with high return 
in this phase and low risk to low return. Table 12, referring to 
period 2, shows a different picture. 
TABLE 12 I P2 
I high I low 
high I B01, 504. I 103. 
Here, the Risk-Return Paradox in the static (one period) sense is 
supported by 6 companies. X* - test indicates a rather weak 
probability of 35 X only. It turns out that consistent statements 
regarding the relationship between risk attitude and performance 
cannot be achieved by the static approach. The life cycle has to 
be regarded as an "intervening variable," influencing significant- 
ly the risk measures which have been investigated in this paper. 
low A01, C01, E01, 
E02, 104. 
K02, L01. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results provided in this paper support the idea that the 
industrial life cycle can serve as a model explaining the Risk 
Return Paradox. From a methodological point of view, it can be 
stated that rather consistent results were achieved with the 
chosen indicators. The main purpose of this paper, that is to 
develop a methodology for investigating long range dynamics rele- 
vant for strategic management, is regaded to be fulfilled. 
By means of a longitudinal study covering a major part of the 
last steel industry cycle, it has been showed that measures for 
entrepreneurial risk seem to be negatively related to the develop- 
ment of company performance ratios. Particularly, the growth 
phase of steel industry cycle was characterized by return values 
higher than the average ratios calculated for the whole period of 
observation, whereas risk measures were low. On the other hand, 
performance was low in the maturity phase, whereas risk ratios 
were higher than the overall average. 
The results on hypothesis 2 seem to indicate that a certain link- 
age between risk attitude and performance exists: companies that 
were more risk-taking than the average during the growth phase, 
obtained more favorable results in the phase of maturity. Simi- 
larly, companies that took less risk than the average during 
phase 1 were affected more severely from crisis than the others. 
We also discovered that a high level of risk attraction during 
growth was connected with a more stable development of all in- 
dicators investigated. substantial fluctuations, however, could 
be observed with those enterprises who were relatively risk-averse 
during growth. 
The question has been raised what kind of "intervening variable" 
creates the fluctuations of entrepreneurial risk attitude along 
the life cycle. Our empirical findings seem to support the hypo- 
thesis that managers usually, and especially under growth condi- 
tions, tend to make their decisions on the assumption that this 
favorable situation will persist. In other words, the economic, 
social and technological environment of the company is regarded 
as stable and long-term changes are neglected. By this strategy, 
the process of decision-making is facilitated (risk is reduced at 
first glance). The risk of environmental change, however, is 
taken and must not be neglected. 
Our findings on hypothesis 2 indicate that structural change 
causes more difficulties to the company the longer it is 
postponed. In order to offset crisis in advance, it seems to be 
very appropriate to take measures already during the growth phase 
(technology push strategy). As was mentioned above, such mea- 
sures can only be justified if the existence of (persistent) 
environmental change is taken into consideration. 
Thus, the following conclusions can be derived, which should be 
confirmed by further testing of the hypotheses. 
t It seems to be reasonable that entrepreneurial risk, measured 
in the traditional sense, should not only be distributed 
among several business activities (i.e., diversification), 
but also especially among time periods referring to dif- 
ferent phases of the industrial life cycle. 
t Decision-makers should regard the company as an open system 
which is linked closely with a constantly changing environ- 
ment. 
t In order to smooth the process of structural change, it 
seems to be necessary to develop promising options for the 
future as long as resources are easily available for that 
purpose (i.e., during the growth phase). 
t More attention has to be devoted to the strategic part of the 
planning process, especially under growth conditions. In 
this respect, the priority of the operative goal of maxi- 
mizing annual profit has to be challenged. 
t Weak signals, documented by a well equipped department for 
information management, can serve as a guideline for making 
future decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
t In order to classify the company's strategic position, it is 
recommendable to analyze its relative risk attitude by com- 
paring it with the respective ratio values of competitors. 
Thus, the entrepreneurial risk attitude can be used as a 
variable to control the company's development. 
APPENDIX 
For the presentation of the results, we use the following ab- 
breviations: 
WCS = Percentage of annual world crude steel production 
change 
NCS = Percentage of annual national crude steel produc- 
tion change 
ROI = Return on investment 
ROE = Return on equity 
POS = Profit on sales 
LF = Percentage of annual change in number of employees 
CCS = Percentage of annual company crude steel production 
change 
LTL = Ltm. liabil. / equity = Ratio of longterm liabi- 
lities divided by equity. 
DIV = Percentage of annual change in diversification 
AVG = Arithmetic mean 
EST = data estimated by multiple regression 
R = Regression coefficient 
HO = Null hypothesis is accepted 
H1 = Null hypothesis is rejected 
- Independent variables X ,  XI, ..., X5 
Y - - Dependent variable 
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